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ABSTRACT
We describe a successful attempt to formally verify a simple
genetic algorithm written in Java. To this end, we compare
several formal verification tools designed for Java, and se-
lect Krakatoa as the most appropriate for the task. Based
on our experience, we present several suggestions for mak-
ing the tools more user friendly, which we hope will lead to
wider adoption of formal methods. In particular, we dis-
cuss at length how useful it would be for provers to perform
some form of abduction, that is, for them to guess which
extra assumptions they need to prove a statement. It is our
opinion that progress in this area would produce the largest
improvement in the usability of formal verification tools.
1. INTRODUCTION
Formal verification is a family of techniques for construct-
ing proofs of the correctness of software. A program with
a formal proof of correctness is much less likely to contain
bugs than one that has merely been tested. Unfortunately,
the process is still prohibitively difficult with current tools,
and formal verification is thus confined to systems with a
very high cost of failure, such as CPU design [23] and air-
craft control systems [30]. However, we hope that better
tools could add formal verification to the average program-
mer’s code-checking toolkit, alongside testing and code re-
view, thus improving code quality across the board.
Additionally, formal methods are easier to apply and have
been better developed for functional programming languages
such as Haskell than for the more commonly used impera-
tive languages such as C and Java. As an example, the
seL4 project to verify an operating system kernel [26] used
Haskell as an intermediate representation in their proof pro-
cess, rather than verifying properties of the C program di-
rectly. As we are interested in encouraging wider adoption of
formal methods, we investigated the current state of the art
for verification of Java programs, a language currently seen
as first or second by popularity [11, 3, 2]. To this end, we
compared several verification tools for Java, and then ver-
ified a simple program using the tool we thought the most
appropriate, Krakatoa [21].
In this paper, we provide a comparison of the tools we inves-
tigated, an overview of our experience with Krakatoa, and
several suggestions for making formal tools more accessible.
1.1 JML
JML (Java Modelling Language) [27] is a language for anno-
tating Java programs with specifications. It supports func-
tion pre- and post-conditions, loop invariants, class invari-
ants, and assertions at arbitrary positions in the code. JML
annotations are specially-formatted comments. Its syntax is
very similar to Java code, making it very easy for a Java pro-
grammer to learn and apply, and it supports some advanced
operations such as \forall and \sum.
Java verification tools universally assume specifications writ-
ten in JML, although they vary in their level of support for
particular JML constructs.
1.2 Models
Reasoning about the behaviour of a program requires encod-
ing the semantics of the programming language into logic
formulae [13]. This encoding is called a model. If the model
and the properties of the program we wish to prove are ex-
pressed as an SMT problem, we can send them to an off-
the-shelf solver that will attempt to prove the assertion or
find a counterexample.
1.3 SMT
Traditional SAT solvers reason about formulas expressed in
pure propositional logic. However, statements we wish to
prove about programs often involve additional constructs
with associated theories, such as the theory of integers, or
the theory of lists. We can thus consider formal verifica-
tion as an SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) problem [5].
While it may be possible to express a theory as a set of
propositional axioms over the objects of interest, it turns
out to be more efficient to extend SAT solvers with special-
purpose routines for reasoning about these theories. Many
such SMT solvers are available, including CVC4 [4], Simplify
[18], Yices [19], and Z3 [16].
1.4 Types of tool
Given a Java program annotated with JML, there are several
possible approaches for checking its correctness.
1.4.1 Runtime assertion checking
JML pre-conditions, post-conditions, class invariants and as-
sertions can be checked at runtime. This is not really formal
verification and will not be further considered here.
1.4.2 Bounded model checking
Bounded model checking verifies the correctness of the pro-
gram assuming some fixed bound on the number of times a
loop body can be executed and a bound on the size of any ar-
rays. Under these assumptions, either a proof of correctness
or a counterexample can usually be generated automatically,
even for complicated specifications. The result is equivalent
to testing all possible inputs up to some size limit. It is
hoped that most bugs in the program will manifest them-
selves on small examples. This is the easiest way to verify
a program, but cannot guarantee correctness for inputs (or
execution paths) that exceed the bounds.
1.4.3 Automated SMT solving
Some tools encode the program and the JML assertions as
an SMT problem and send it to an off-the-shelf SMT solver.
For this kind of proof to succeed, loops need to be annotated
with appropriate invariants. Even then, between proof and
counterexample lies a large space of inputs on which the
SMT solvers will time out or report failure. A verification
tool based on automated SMT solving (only) will then also
report failure. The only way to respond is to change the an-
notations to something that might be easier to prove, or to
abandon the proof attempt. In our experience, it is usually
possible (but difficult) to find annotations that lead to suc-
cess. The automated SMT solving approach is sometimes
referred to as ESC (Extended Static Checking).
1.4.4 Interactive SMT solving
Some tools can also encode the SMT problem in a format
suitable for sending to an interactive proof assistant such as
Isabelle/HOL [29] or Coq [1]. KeY[6] comes with its own in-
teractive proof environment. These tools can still send proof
obligations to an automated solver, but when the attempt
fails they allow the user to try completing the proof inter-
actively. We thus refer to them as Automated/Interactive
SMT tools.
1.4.5 Embedding in a theorem prover
It is also possible to port the entire program to the na-
tive language of Isabelle/HOL or Coq, and prove statements
about this version. Several Java programs have been verified
in this way [28, 12]. This gives maximum proving power, but
potentially sacrifices the ease of the automated tools. There
is also no guarantee that the Isabelle/HOL version of the
program accurately captures all the semantics of the source
language (e.g. integer overflows). The approach of seL4
[26] is similar to this – a separate proof of the behaviour of
a Haskell program, and of the correctness of a C program
with respect to this Haskell specification.
2. COMPARISON
We first present a side-by-side comparison of several tools,
and then more detailed comments on our experience with
each tool. In some cases, we use simple subjective judge-
ments rather than something precise like “man-hours” be-
cause different users are likely to work at different rates.
2.1 Brief comparison
Tables 1, 2 and 3 give an overview of the tools we compared.
The columns are described below, with “?” meaning that we
could not download the tool or we could not get it to run.
Table 1: Overview of Java verification tools surveyed
Tool Available Maintained Type Ref
LOOP ✗ ✗ ? [31]
JACK ✗ ✗ ? [8]
TACO ✓ ? BMC [24]
Sireum/Kiasan ✓ ? BMC [17]
ESC/Java2 ✓ ✗ A-SMT [15]
OpenJML ✓ ✓ A-SMT [14]
KeY ✓ ✓ A/I-SMT [6]
Krakatoa ✓ ✗ A/I-SMT [21]
Table 2: Capabilities
Tool Java version FP \forall \sum
LOOP ? ? ? ?
JACK ? ? ? ?
TACO = 6 ✗ ✓ ✓
Sireum/Kiasan = 6 ✗ ✗ ✗
ESC/Java2 = 4 ? ? ?
OpenJML = 7 ✗ ✓ ✗
KeY ≥ 6 ✗ ✓ ✓
Krakatoa Any ✓ ✓ ✗
Table 3: Ease of use
Tool Setup Use
LOOP ? ?
JACK ? ?
TACO Difficult Very Easy
Sireum/Kiasan Difficult Easy
ESC/Java2 Very Difficult ?
OpenJML Difficult Average
KeY Average Very Difficult
Krakatoa Very Difficult Easy
Available Was the tool available for download?
Maintained Are the tool’s developers still involved, or has
it been abandoned?
Type The type of tool: BMC (Bounded Model Checker),
A-SMT (Automated SMT solver), A/I-SMT (Interac-
tive SMT solver).
Java version An indication of the Java versions supported
by the tool.
FP Can the tool reason about floating-point variables?
\forall Does the tool understand the JML \forall anno-
tation? It is useful for reasoning about arrays.
\sum Does the tool understand the JML \sum annotation?
It is useful for proving termination of complex loops.
Setup Subjective judgement of how difficult we found it to
install the tool and get it to work.
Use Subjective judgement of how difficult we found it to
use the tool on several toy programs.
2.2 Detailed observations
2.2.1 LOOP and JACK
LOOP and JACK seem to have been popular and very promis-
ing in the early 2000s [7], but LOOP no longer has a website
and JACK’s download links no longer work:
http://www-sop.inria.fr/everest/soft/Jack/jack.html
2.2.2 TACO
This tool takes a little effort to set up, but it illustrates
the benefits of bounded model checking. It easily proves
(bounded versions of) statements that the more powerful
tools struggle with. It does not support floating point arith-
metic and knows it, producing an error message:
http://www.dc.uba.ar/inv/grupos/rfm_folder/TACO
2.2.3 Sireum/Kiasan
Sireum/Kiasan is another bounded model checker that we
felt was inferior to TACO. It claims to support floating point,
but in fact does not (it proves the statement 0.0 == 1.0).
It also does not support the \forall annotation, which is
vital for reasoning about arrays:
https://code.google.com/archive/p/sireum/
2.2.4 ESC/Java2
This tool seems to have been popular in its time, but has
been superseded by OpenJML. It was difficult to install and
we were unable to get it to run. Supposedly it can send proof
obligations to Coq, which might elevate it to A/I-SMT sta-
tus (OpenJML cannot do this at the present time):
http://kindsoftware.com/products/opensource/ESCJava2/
2.2.5 OpenJML
The state of the art automated SMT tool. We found it
difficult to get working, but eventually succeeded. Unfor-
tunately, it was not very useful. When attempting a proof,
OpenJML sends an SMT problem to a solver. If the solver
fails, it gives up. The only action available afterwards is to
edit loop invariants, in the hope that something will make
the prover succeed. For proving simple properties, however,
OpenJML is quite easy to use. It does not support floating
point and produces an error message:
http://www.openjml.org/
2.2.6 KeY
KeY is the most prominent interactive tool for Java verifica-
tion. It has its own interactive proof environment, and sup-
ports sending proof obligations to SMT solvers. However,
we found it extremely difficult to accomplish anything in
the tool. The documentation was several years (and several
major versions) out of date. We were not able to actually
launch an SMT solver from within KeY. We also could not
introduce a lemma in the interactive environment. KeY had
patchy support for some JML features – in particular, we
did not know how to specify that some element of an array
is not modified in a loop body. Finally, KeY has a floating
point option of questionable utility, unable as it is to prove
that 0.0 == 0.0:
http://www.key-project.org/
2.2.7 Krakatoa
Krakatoa is the most promising tool of the ones we have
tried. It is built on Why3 [22], a programming language
and toolchain designed for verification. Krakatoa leverages
the existing toolchain to convert Java programs and JML
annotations into SMT problems, or Coq or Isabelle proof
goals. Krakatoa is the only tool we found that can reason
correctly about floating point variables. It can treat them as
mathematical real numbers, or use a third-party Coq library
that describes the precise behaviour of IEEE floating point.
Within the tool, the user can split proofs into separate obli-
gations. The tool can display which code block each obliga-
tion refers to, and can send them to SMT solvers separately.
This produces several benefits. Firstly, if one proof attempt
fails and another succeeds, the user knows which aspect of
the code to focus on. Secondly, users might decide that they
are satisfied with leaving some aspect unproven. The tool
also provides separate goals for e.g. invariant preservation
and termination, and separate goals for null pointer checks,
array bounds checks, and integer overflows. Thus, a user can
choose to ignore these error conditions if they wish. Many of
the other tools allow us to turn off integer overflow checking
(for simplicity), but only before beginning the proof.
Unfortunately, Krakatoa does not support the JML \sum
and \max statements. These are very helpful for proving
termination of a loop (as part of the variant that decreases
with each loop iteration). However, Krakatoa does techni-
cally allow the inductive definition of complex logical func-
tions (which are converted directly into Coq functions), so
the sum could be defined in this way.
Finally, we found it extraordinarily difficult to actually in-
stall Krakatoa. Although the tool is currently ”frozen”while
the team works on Why3, it gives the appearance of being
well maintained. However, the install scripts seem to be
broken, and the tool failed to automatically install its de-
pendencies and Coq libraries. It took much effort to run the
tool, but the result was pleasing. We thus decided to use
Krakatoa for our verification task:
http://krakatoa.lri.fr/
3. VERIFICATION
The Java program we verified is available at:
https://github.com/dmitry-brizhinev/formal-verification.
It is a simple genetic algorithm that investigates different
deterrence strategies in international conflict. This compu-
tational model may be the subject of a future paper.
3.1 Computational modelling
Computational modelling in the sciences involves running a
simulation of some kind of system and observing the results.
If the assumptions that went into the system hold in the real
world, it is hoped that any insights gained from observing
it will carry over to an understanding of the real-world phe-
nomena of interest.
The functional correctness of such models is an issue not
often addressed. If a model with assumptions X produces
output Y, we want to be confident that it is the dynam-
ics of the model that led to Y, not a bug. However, since
the desired output of the model is unknown, such bugs are
often not obvious, and it is not necessarily possible to con-
struct test cases. Indeed, the model may produce output
that the experimenter expects, and thus incorrectly confirm
their preconceptions, due to a bug. Formal methods are a
natural solution to this problem.
3.2 Specification
The first step in formally verifying a piece of software is to
specify its behaviour in an appropriate form. The verifica-
tion process then provides a proof that the program’s real
behaviour adheres to the specification.
Unfortunately, the program in question relies heavily on ran-
dom numbers. Thus, an ideal specification would need to
express statements such as this function correctly calculates
the expected value of this random variable. As it stands, the
Java Modelling Language provides no means to reason about
random numbers, so the best specification of the function’s
behaviour is the code itself. When no separate specifica-
tion is possible, formal verification adds no value. Instead,
the verification effort focused on proving that no exceptions
could be raised during execution, and on a few basic asser-
tions (such as: that the expected value of an event with two
possible outcomes is somewhere between the outcomes).
Each function was annotated with pre- and post-conditions
that ensured all objects and arrays used by the code were
valid at all times. There were also a few assertions ensuring
that the output values of functions were reasonable.
Full verification of this kind requires the use of appropriate
loop invariants. These were added as they became necessary
during the course of the proof.
3.3 Workflow
The Krakatoa tool takes a Java source file annotated with
JML assertions and produces a list of Why3 obligations. The
Why3 tool then provides an interface for proving these obli-
gations. It can perform some basic manipulations (such as
splitting an obligation into parts), send obligations to auto-
mated provers (such as the SMT solvers CVC4, Z3, Simplify,
and Yices), or create proof scripts for interactive provers
(such as Coq or Isabelle). Why3 also makes an effort to dis-
play which line of Java code each obligation refers to, which
assertion (or safety property) it is checking, and which as-
sertions it includes as assumptions.
Verifying code using Krakatoa is a trial-and-error process.
The initial JML annotations are unlikely to be sufficient.
Having observed the proof goals generated by the tool, and
which of them the automated provers cannot solve, one re-
turns to the code and adds annotations as necessary. There
is a lot of boilerplate in the final product. For example,
many functions come with post-conditions guaranteeing that
the function does not deallocate the objects it works with.
Sometimes a proof goal is out of reach of the automated
provers but can be discharged interactively in Coq. Most of
the time, however, an attempt at a proof in Coq simply il-
lustrates which assumptions are missing. Once the relevant
assertions are added, the automated prover succeeds.
3.4 Result
The correctness and safety of the model was mostly proven.
We did not find any errors. There are three gaps (unfulfilled
obligations) in the proof.
Firstly, although Krakatoa correctly adds the values of static
final int constants as assumptions, it ignores the values of
static final double ones. Thus, the value of one constant
had to be added as a precondition to the main method for
the proof to succeed.
Secondly, Krakatoa provides very little to work with upon
entering an object constructor. It is impossible to prove that
the new object being constructed is not equal to any other
object already in existence. This thus remains an unproven
assertion in the program. It is not true in general (if the ob-
ject has a superclass, the superclass constructor may have
already assigned the object to something else in the environ-
ment), Krakatoa simply does not provide any assumptions
that would allow one to prove the statement even in specific
cases where it is true. Notably, the software includes a few
test cases for situations akin to this, but the test cases are
very weak – Krakatoa would fail to prove almost anything
more complicated than those specific cases.
Finally, Krakatoa is unable to prove that System.out !=
null, which makes it impossible to verify the safety of a
print statement.
All other proof obligations generated by Krakatoa have been
proven. 506 out of 512 were completed automatically, us-
ing CVC4 and Z3. Interestingly, the tools complemented
each other. Some goals that Z3 could not prove were easily
discharged by CVC4, and vice-versa. Only six goals were
completed manually in Coq.
There are three instances of a loop invariant with an exis-
tential quantifier. The automated provers were unable to
prove that the invariant holds initially. The proof is triv-
ially completed with two lines in Coq - first, specifying an
appropriate value, and then using the auto tactic.
There is one complex inequality – the property of the ex-
pected value calculation mentioned earlier. This requires a
quite involved Coq proof of about 120 lines.
Finally, there was a function with a fairly complex loop
invariant that the automated provers could not quite ver-
ify. There are two goals, for the two possible outcomes of a
branch within the loop. Each goal requires a fairly simple
Coq proof, of about 15 lines. We present one of these proofs
as an example in Appendix C.
The result is some confidence that the code is free from bugs.
Unfortunately, this guarantee rests on the assumption that
Krakatoa has no soundness errors. As discussed below, this
assumption is not as safe as one would like.
Additionally, Krakatoa models floating-point variables as
mathematical real numbers, so there are no guarantees about
floating-point overflow or rounding. This model is still su-
perior to anything provided by other Java tools.
Finally, through a special annotation, we instructed Kraka-
toa to ignore integer overflow. This made the proving pro-
cess much simpler, but is another source of potential un-
soundness. In particular, the model would overflow if it is
allowed to run for enough cycles, but it generally does not
run that long.
4. POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENT
We believe that wider adoption of formal methods is de-
sirable, because it would improve the quality of software.
For this to happen, the tools need to become easier to use;
both so that existing users could apply formal methods more
widely, and to make them accessible to a greater population.
Based on our experience with Krakatoa, we have identified
several areas in which we think more work would be particu-
larly fruitful. We note that our list does not include improv-
ing the power of automated SMT solvers, which would ini-
tially seem the most obvious approach to making machine-
assisted proof work easier.
4.1 Maintenance
Many of these tools surveyed appear to be academic projects
that were created and then abandoned. Some, like LOOP
and JACK, are no longer accessible. Others do not sup-
port recent versions of Java. Installing old versions of Java
is not only an extra burden during setup, it is also a secu-
rity risk. Most tools were unexpectedly difficult to set up.
Many of them had undocumented dependencies or broken
install packages. They often produced unhelpful error mes-
sages when their dependencies were not satisfied. Finally,
documentation was either lacking, incomplete, or severely
outdated. We could not complete our proof in Krakatoa un-
til we looked at the developers’ test cases, which showcased
several undocumented annotations.
If a hypothetical researcher wishes to create a tool that peo-
ple will actually use, we recommend that they plan ahead
to make sure they can document its features, and provide
some rudimentary maintenance in the future. This does not
mean supporting every new Java construct as it appears,
but it would be an enormous improvement if the tools could
at least parse more recent Java *.class files and provide
precise error messages about unsupported features of Java.
4.2 Bugs
Krakatoa was the only tool we used for long enough to no-
tice actual bugs in the program. Besides a slew of Java
features that the tool did not support and which elicited ob-
scure error messages, there were several of what we would
call completeness errors, where Krakatoa did not provide
enough assumptions to prove true statements. An exam-
ple is Krakatoa’s treatment of class invariants. For each
class invariant, Krakatoa generates pre- and post-conditions
for each of the class’s functions. It also generates appro-
priate pre-conditions as assumptions to functions that take
elements of the class as parameters. However, Krakatoa does
not assume that elements of an array satisfy the invariant.
Thus, we had to manually add and prove the assertion that
all elements of an array were valid at all times.
Completeness errors are not as bad as soundness errors, but
their presence is a bad sign. Completeness errors stand out
when we cannot complete a proof. However, we would not
notice if one of Krakatoa’s premises was unsound – a proof
of something we believe to be true would simply succeed
where it should not. Thus, a formal verification tool with
completeness errors gives far less confidence than it should
in the soundness of the proof it produces.
4.3 Floating point support
IEEE floating point arithmetic is complicated, and it is un-
surprising that most of the tools do not support it. How-
ever, most scientific computing uses floating point arith-
metic. Hence, in the context of verifying a computational
model, floating point support is essential. Modelling float-
ing point variables as real numbers is not ideal, but is better
than nothing. We see this shortcut as being akin to ignoring
integer overflow – it may be an acceptable approximation,
as long as we are aware of its limitations.
Much worse than a lack of floating point support is fake
support. While TACO produced error messages informing
us that it did not support floating point, Sireum/Kiasan and
KeY claimed that they did. However, Sireum/Kiasan proved
the false statement that 0.0 == 1.0, and KeY was unable
to prove that 0.0 == 0.0. While x = x is not a theorem for
IEEE floating points (NaN 6= NaN), a special case like that
should be provable if their behaviour is adequately modelled.
A tool that cannot prove such a triviality is no better than
one that does not support floating point arithmetic at all.
4.4 Error messages
Even before reaching the proving stage, many of the tools
surveyed failed to parse Java source or *.class files with
unhelpful error messages. Syntax error on line X is bad
(especially when the correct syntax is undocumented), but
assertion failure in parser is even worse. Widely used com-
pilers have become adept at explaining their reasons for fail-
ure, and formal verification tools should also aim to do so.
4.5 Comprehensible proof goals
By the end of the process, we discovered that automated
SMT solvers could prove almost all of the statements of in-
terest about our program. However, this was only after a
long time spent adjusting the JML annotations. At the be-
ginning of the process, it seemed that automated tools were
hopelessly inadequate, and that better solvers or interactive
provers were necessary. This can create the illusion that
more progress in automated proving is needed to make for-
mal methods more accessible. But it is our opinion that two
completely different factors are crucial. The first is reason-
ing about missing assumptions, which we discuss in the next
section. The other is comprehensible proof goals.
By comprehensible goals we mean that formal verification
tools today do little to help the user understand the details
of the formal logical statement they are trying to prove. This
statement is the result of a complex transformation process
peculiar to each tool, and may be very different from what
the user expects based on the source code they are working
with. Often, understanding the proof goal is enough to see
which annotations need to be changed.
The most incomprehensible goals come from the fully au-
tomated tools like OpenJML. These tools opaquely convert
annotations into proof goals, send them to SMT solvers, and
fail. Because the user cannot see the unprovable goal, they
do not know why the proof failed. Appendix A gives an
example of a mistake that may trip up novices, and which
tools should be able to prevent.
Some tools do display their proof goals. The interactive
tools, KeY and Krakatoa, provide a full proof script that
the user can examine. This is an improvement, as it often
becomes clearer why a proof is failing once one has inves-
tigated the obligation closely, and perhaps even attempted
an interactive proof. However, it is not ideal, because the
language in which the proof goal is expressed is very far
removed from the Java code it is based on, and important
details are often obscured by copious boilerplate.
We feel that making an effort to explain proof goals to
the user in terms of the code they are working with would
make the tools enormously more accessible. This means ex-
pressing the statements being proved not in terms of com-
plex mangled names for constructs from the tool’s memory
model, but in terms of Java objects, and lines of Java code.
In Appendix B we include an example of what this would
look like in our ideal world.
4.6 Inferring missing assumptions
As mentioned earlier, most of our program was successfully
verified with automated tools, but only after a long pro-
cess of editing the annotations. Most of these edits involved
adding assumptions that were missing from the proof goal,
such as function pre-conditions and loop invariants. We
added them after looking closely at the generated proof goal,
or attempting an interactive proof and discovering the miss-
ing hypothesis. This bears repeating: the vast majority of
the statements that the SMT solvers could not prove were in
fact false. More precisely, they were true when expressed as
JML assertions, but the proof obligations generated by the
tool were false, as they lacked information not captured by
the annotations. The main barrier to completing the proof
automatically was not the power of the provers, but inade-
quate annotations. We present an example in appendix B.
With SMT solvers doing the proving, most of our effort was
spent on inferring which assumptions were missing from our
JML annotations. Thus, we believe the greatest potential
for making formal verification more user friendly is in find-
ing ways to automatically answer the question which extra
assumptions would make this goal true? This is the prob-
lem referred to as abduction [9], and we suffer no illusions
as to its difficulty. Abductive reasoning has been studied in
logic [25], philosophy [20] and artificial intelligence [32] as a
means of inferring the cause of an event. Some such capa-
bility added to formal verification tools might allow them to
make suggestions for extra annotations. Appendix B con-
tains a concrete example.
We are aware of one static analysis tool, Facebook’s INFER
[10], that uses a form of abduction. The INFER tool checks
several common error conditions such as null pointer deref-
erences, and does not require any annotations, because it
infers pre- and post-conditions automatically. We have not
investigated INFER in this paper because it does not verify
user-specified post-conditions or assertions.
5. CONCLUSION
Tools for formal verification of Java programs are in gener-
ally poor shape, and do not support recent versions of Java.
Nonetheless, they do exist, and are usable enough to verify
a program. SMT solvers are powerful enough to prove most
true statements of interest; the most difficult aspect of veri-
fication was, in our experience, finding the right annotations
to use to ensure the provers had enough assumptions to work
with. We believe wider adoption of formal methods would
be beneficial, and making the tools more user-friendly will
bring about this goal. Existing tools could use better doc-
umentation, error messages, and fewer bugs. We also think
a large usability gain is waiting to be realised by tools that
can clearly relate the proof goals they generate to the source
code the user is working with, and that can suggest missing
assumptions to the user that would make a proof succeed.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF GOAL EXAMPLE
When proof goals are opaque, there is no way to know if
an SMT solver’s failure was because the statement is false,
because the statement is very very difficult, or because the
assumptions need a trivial strengthening. For example, the
SMT tools could not automatically prove that the code be-
low would not cause an ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException:
//@ invariant (\forall int j;
0 <= j < i ==> array[j] == 0);
for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
array[i] = 0;
The solution is to add 0 <= i <= array.length to the in-
variant. Those experienced in formal methods will see this
immediately, but novices may be baffled by the tools’ inabil-
ity to prove simple statements.
If the tool showed the user the proof goal, along with its
assumptions, they should be able to spot the error quickly.
B. MISSING ASSUMPTION EXAMPLE
A prover that could report I could complete this proof, if
only I knew that P holds, would represent an enormous us-
ability improvement. We present here a simple example of
the obscurity of the proof goals generated by Krakatoa, and
of the kind of suggestion we would like to see from an ideal
prover with abductive reasoning capability.
The following code:
class Example {
int[] field;
void doNothing() {
return;
}
static void func(Example object) {
object.field = new int[10];
object.doNothing();
//@ assert object.field.length == 10;
}
}
Would produce a long and complicated proof goal filled with
boilerplate, which no SMT solver will prove. But somewhere
in there would be something like this:
Axiom:
(Jessie_memory_model.offset_max
usObject_alloc_table
(Jessie_memory_model.select
usField object)) + 1 = 10
Proof Goal:
(Jessie_memory_model.offset_max
usObject_alloc_table1
(Jessie_memory_model.select
usField object)) + 1 = 10
It takes experience with Krakatoa to understand this. The
small change in usObject_alloc_table is the culprit. The
statement expresses the proposition
object.field.length == 10
More specifically, the goal is to prove that the array still has
the same length as it did earlier. Because the doNothing()
function is not annotated, Krakatoa will not make any as-
sumptions about the value of fields after it is called. Thus,
it is impossible to prove anything about their value. To fix
this, we should annotate doNothing() with details about
which fields it changes, and which fields remain the same.
Ideally, when this proof fails, the prover should report that
it needs the extra assumption
(Jessie_memory_model.offset_max
usObject_alloc_table
(Jessie_memory_model.select
usField object))
= (Jessie_memory_model.offset_max
usObject_alloc_table1
(Jessie_memory_model.select
usField object)).
Even better, the tool should be able to relate this to ac-
tual Java code, and report something like I cannot prove
that object.field.length at line 9 of the file is equal to
object.field.length at line 11.
C. COQ PROOF EXAMPLE
This is an example of the short Coq proof for one of the loop
invariants. This is the loop in question, edited for clarity:
int best = 0;
/*@
loop_invariant
(\forall int j; 0 <= j < h ==>
expectedValue(j) <= expectedValue(best))
@*/
for (int h = 1; h < ATTACK_TYPES; h++) {
if (expectedValue(h) > expectedValue(best))
best = h;
}
The invariant produces three obligations. One to prove that
it holds initially, and one to prove that it holds after exe-
cuting the body where the if block is not entered, and one
where the block is entered. We present the third of these,
where the block is entered.
The proof script itself is the file ending in
...highestExpectedValue_ensures_default_5.v
in the git repository https://github.com/dmitry-brizhinev/formal-verification.
It contains copious amounts of boilerplate. We present here
a version heavily edited for conciseness and clarity:
Variable j:Z, h’:Z, h:Z, best_old:Z, best_new:Z
Premise p1: forall (j’:Z), (0 <= j’ < h’)
expectedValue j’ <= expectedValue best_old
Premise p2: expectedValue best_old < expectedValue h’
Premise p3: best_new = h’
Premise p4: h = h’ + 1
Premise p5: 0 <= j < h
Goal: expectedValue j <= expectedValue best_new
Proof:
rewrite p3.
cut (0 <= j < h’ \/ j = h’).
intro.
destruct H.
cut (expectedValue j <= expectedValue best_old).
intro.
apply Rle_trans with (r2 := expectedValue best_old).
trivial.
auto with *.
auto.
rewrite H.
auto with *.
omega.
Qed.
The key elements of the proof are:
1. The first cut, splitting the proof into the cases j < h’
and j = h’.
2. Destruct, which considers the two cases separately.
3. The second cut, which instantiates premise p1 with j’
= j.
4. The use of the transitivity of less-than, which connects
premises p1 and p2
5. Omega, which automatically solves some inequalities.
